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When last Thursday, 23 November 2017, the Polish parliament (Sejm) held the first plenary debate about the
new bills on the judiciary, it achieved a record in the world history of parliamentarism: the first parliamentary
debate that was entirely about a non-existing project. The presidential bills at the time were still subject to
negotiations between the President and the leadership of the parliamentary majority, and while the outcome has
not been reached yet, one thing was clear: the presidential proposals will not be submitted to the Sejm in the
version in which they were drafted by the President’s lawyers. Hence the debate was moot, a fact which was
recognized by the majority MPs who were conspicuously absent during the debate. This grotesque event is
emblematic of the state of affairs in Poland regarding two draft laws vetoed by President Andrzej Duda last July,
on the Supreme Court (SC) and on the National Council of Judiciary (Polish acronym: KRS).
So even as I am writing these words (28 November), the general public in Poland has no idea what specific
changes to the presidential proposals have been agreed upon by the negotiators and will be debated in the
Parliament soon, perhaps even later this week. “Negotiations” is the right word: the discussions between the
President and the leader of governing “Law and Justice” party PiS, Jarosław Kaczyński, have been going on
behind a thick veil of secrecy and are kept hidden from the public. That in itself is scandalous, of course: The
matter of the “reform” of the judiciary is not a strategic or military or business issue which must be kept
confidential. But the unexpected presidential veto of last July caused PiS a great sense of hurt and
disappointment, and they have treated the matter as extremely sensitive. They do not want to have any
unexpected objections from their own President anymore.
But make no mistake: The Presidential vetoes have not triggered any new proposals which would be qualitatively
better in terms of consistency with the Constitution than the initial PiS bills that he vetoed. Both the PiS and the
President’s proposals are glaringly unconstitutional, though in different ways. They differ in the ways they reflect
different vested interests within different groups of the ruling elite more than in their interpretation of the
Constitution. If, in next iterations of the debate, we see PiS adopting some of the ideas in the President’s bills, it
will be a compromise between two unconstitutional proposals. Such a compromise, by its nature, cannot be
constitutional.
Both laws vetoed by President and about to be discussed, in whatever new form given to it by PiS, aimed at
politicising the KRS and the SC, by granting politicians some new, greatly enhanced instruments to affect the
composition of the KRS and the SC. Regarding the KRS, the entire focus has been on the mode of selection of
the 15 judicial members of the KRS (besides the heads of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative
Tribunal, the Minister of Justice, the representative of the President, four representatives of the Sejm and two
representatives of the Senate, elected respectively by these bodies). Under the initial PiS proposal the judicial
members were to be elected by a simple majority of the Sejm, which would have meant that PiS would select all
of them. Duda objected to that, claiming that the opposition should also pick some members, so he proposed an
election by Sejm by a 3/5 majority, and if such a procedure did not result in filling all the judicial posts on the
KRS (highly likely under the current party composition of the Sejm), there would be an unusual method of voting
whereby each MP would had only one vote for a single judicial KRS member, which would hopefully give the
opposition  some places on the KRS. Leaks from “negotiations” between the President and PiS leadership
suggest that the new compromise proposal would be that the parliamentary majority would control nine and the
opposition six of the judicial seats in the KRS.
All this shows a drastically unconstitutional approach to filling the judicial segment of the KRS: while the
Constitution does not articulate explicitly who elects the judicial members of the KRS, since its enactment in
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1997 it has been always accepted as a given that these posts are filled by judges. It became an unquestioned
and uncontested constitutional custom. It is also supported by a structural interpretation: since Art. 187 of the
Constitution provides explicitly that the Sejm elects its four representatives, if the constitution-makers wanted to
give the Sejm a role also in electing the judicial members, it would have said so expressly. The KRS’s
fundamental role is to propose to the President all judicial appointments, so the idea that the judges themselves
should play a dominant role in these decisions has been treated as an essential guarantee of judicial
independence. Both PiS’ and the President’s proposals dispense with this guarantee, and the only difference
between them is whether PiS will “take all” or share with the opposition the role in filling the judicial positions on
the KRS. Both are unconstitutional by transferring from judges to politicians the decision on the judicial members
of KRS. While the presidential proposal may seem slightly less radical, from a constitutional point of view it is
equally objectionable as the initial proposal by PiS.
Another obviously unconstitutional point in the President’s proposal regarding the KRS is that it ends the terms
of office of its members (just like the initial PiS proposal) as of the day the new law enters into force, whereas the
Constitution guarantees them a fixed term of office of four years. Again, this is one of those examples of
“statutory amendments” of the Constitution for which the regime of PiS has become infamous.
Incidentally, in this respect a newly captured “Constitutional Tribunal” came in  very handy. Just a few months
ago, the newly subjugated CT (with a PiS majority and with three improperly elected “judges”) found the current
statute on the KRS unconstitutional on the basis that it discriminates against judges of the lower courts by
establishing different procedures of appointment for judicial members of KRS depending on the level of courts
they represent. The Constitution does not mandate any particular methods of selection of the judicial
representatives in the KRS, though, and the specific design of the elections was perfectly within the legislative
discretion. It also found unconstitutional a system of allegedly “individual” terms of office of particular judicial
members of the KRS while it claimed that the Constitution requires a “joint/collective” term of office – even
though the Constitution does not imply any such thing, and in any event, there is nothing about the statutory
terms of office which renders it individual rather than collective. All in all, these constitutional objections were
clearly pretextual, in order to pave the way to the new statute on the KRS. And President Andrzej Duda in a
recent TV interview (26 November, at TVN24) referred to that “judgment” as a ground for ending the term of
office of the KRS members. It shows how the “Tribunal” is not merely paralyzed but actually used as a positive
aid in dismantling constitutional guarantees and structures.
Exactly the same observations on unconstitutionality can be made about the presidential bill on the Supreme
Court. The original PiS bill envisaged a radical “zero option”: all judges on the Supreme Court (including the
Chief Justice) would have their terms of office terminated ex lege, and then the Minister of Justice (who is ex
officio also Attorney General) would decide who of those judges may stay (if they apply for this privilege), and all
of the remaining positions would be filled by the newly reformed KRS, i.e., indirectly by the PiS parliamentary
majority. The President objected to such an outright capture of the SC by the ruling party, but again his proposal
is just as unconstitutional as that of the PiS: All judges over 65 years of age would have to retire, and those of the
retired judges who would ask for a permission to continue in office could be permitted to stay on (or not) by the
President. Such a radical retirement age regulation would affect some 40 percent of the current judges of the SC,
including the Chief Justice. In her case, the regulation would be directly contrary to an explicit 6-years term of
office guaranteed by the Constitution (Art. 183), but according to the President, in the TV interview just
mentioned, the retirement age rule has priority over constitutional term of office.
In addition, the President would introduce a new chamber to the SC, namely that of Public Affairs (in this he
echoes the original PiS proposal), with some ominous implications. The chamber would be fully composed of
PiS nominees (because, as a new chamber, it would be filled with brand-new judges, hence appointed by a new,
PiS-controlled KRS). Among its competences would be adjudicating lawsuits regarding the (in)validity of
parliamentary and other elections. A scary prospect, indeed.
As one can see, the presidential proposals regarding the laws on the KRS and the SC are littered with instances
of unconstitutionality. Whether, and in what ways, those proposals will be amended by the PiS parliamentary
majority in order to find a “compromise” between the President and PiS leadership is ultimately unimportant.
Unconstitutionality, just as pregnancy, knows no degrees. The President, himself an academic lawyer, breaches
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the explicit constitutional provisions and also constitutional customs, the latter being no less imperative than the
textual articles of the Constitution. His July vetoes recall an old proverb: The mountain laboured and brought
forth a mouse. And a rather ugly one, at that.
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